Επιλογή μεταξύ χιλιάδων καθηγητών

Επιλογή μεταξύ χιλιάδων καθηγητών

Αποτελέσματα (Αγγλικά) 1:

Choice among thousands of teachers

Αποτελέσματα (Αγγλικά) 2:

Choice between thousands of teachers

Αποτελέσματα (Αγγλικά) 3:

INTRODUCTIONThe theory of capital structure and its relationship with a firm’s value and performance has been a puzzling issue in corporate finance and accounting literature since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) (MM-1958). MM-1958 argue that under very restrictive assumptions of perfect capital markets, investors’ homogenous expectations, tax-free economy, and no transactions costs, capital structure is irrelevant in determining firm value. According to this proposition, a firm’s value is determined by its real assets, not by the mix of securities it issues. If this proposition does not hold then arbitrage mechanisms will take place, investor will buy the shares of the undervalued firm and sell the shares of the overvalued firm in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal (Ebaid, 2009). However, these restrictive assumptions do not hold in the real world, which led many researchers to introduce additional rationalization for this proposition and its underling assumptions showing that capital structure affects firm’s value and performance, especially after the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976) which demonstrate that the amount of leverage in a firm’s capital structure affects the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interest of shareholders and, thus, can alter manager’s behaviors and operating decisions, which means that the amount of leverage in capital structure affects firm performance (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brav et al., 2005, for overviews). Since, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argument regarding the possibility of capital structure influence on firm performance, several researchers have followed this extension and conducted numerous studies that aim to examine the relationship between financial leverage and firm performance over the last decades. However, empirical evidence regarding this relationship is contradictory and mixed. While a positive relationship between leverage level and firm performance had been documented in some of these studies (Taub, 1975; Roden and Lewellen, 1995; Champion, 1999; Ghosh et al., 2000; Hadlock and James, 2002). Other studies document a negative relationship between leverage level and firm performance (Fama and French, 1998; Gleason et al., 2000; Simerly and Li, 2000). While the literature examining the performance implications of capital structure choices is immense in developed markets (e.g. USA and Europe), little is empirically known about such implications in emerging or transition economies such Iran. In such a country as Eldomiaty (2007) argued capital market is less efficient and incomplete and suffers from higher level of information asymmetry than capital markets in developed countries. This environment of the market may cause financing decisions to be incomplete and subject to a considerable degree of irregularity